Someone tells us about a disappointment and we immediately search our memory for a similar experience. That may be a beginning, but it does not give direct access to their mind. In the opening chapter of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith starts from precisely this distance: we do not have immediate experience of what another person feels. We can approach it by imagining what we might feel in a similar situation. This is a philosophical account of human relationships, not an experiment measuring the brain. [1]
Today’s phrase comes from that passage: “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation”. It appears in Part I, Section I, Chapter I, in the Dublin edition of 1777 consulted here. Smith continues by explaining how this operation lets us form some conception of another person’s sensations without removing the difference between experiencing something and observing it. We retain the original English wording. The Italian and French versions are editorial translations, not words attributed to an unnamed historical translator. [1]
Sympathy here does not simply mean liking somebody. Smith uses the word for fellow-feeling that can involve joy, gratitude or sorrow. Within the chapter, he distinguishes seeing an emotion from knowing the circumstances that produced it. Someone’s anger, for example, may repel us until we understand what happened. This is not a formula for approving every reaction. It asks us to consider the situation rather than treating the visible expression as a complete explanation of the person experiencing it. [1]
Consider an editorial example. A friend comes out of an important test without speaking. We might assume they are sad because that is what happened to us; they might instead be tired or still concentrating. Smith’s account suggests a movement towards another person, while our example adds a practical caution: asking a question leaves room for their answer. We are not quoting a conversation rule written by the philosopher. We are using his distinction between imagination and direct experience to examine how we listen. [1]
The most useful point is therefore not to declare that we know exactly how somebody feels. It is to recognise both a possibility and a limit: we can care about a life unlike our own, but we reconstruct it from what we know. In Smith’s text imagination enables that movement; in our editorial reading, humility stops us treating it as a finished achievement. Being close to someone does not require turning every story they tell into another chapter of our own autobiography, however familiar that temptation may be. [1]
Take this with youWhen you recognise an emotion, separate what you observed from what you imagined. Then leave enough space for the other person’s answer.
One idea, in simple words
Adam Smith asked how we can understand other people’s feelings. We cannot go directly inside their minds. However, we can imagine being in a similar situation. Smith used sympathy to describe this sharing in feelings. It can involve happiness as well as sadness. Today’s phrase says that imagination lets us place ourselves in another person’s situation. That does not mean we know everything about them. Here is an editorial example: a quiet friend could be sad or simply tired. We can ask instead of deciding immediately. Smith’s explanation is a philosophical reflection, not a scientific brain test. It helps us separate what we imagine from what another person actually tells us. [1]
A little discovery to keep
What did you discover?
Read the sources (1)
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I, Section I, Chapter I: Of Sympathy — Dublin 1777 edition Adam Smith · Project Gutenberg · accessed 28 Oct 2026
Original writing and illustration made with AI assistance. Our editorial method
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